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A B S T R A C T
Instrumental learning, i.e., learning that specific behaviors lead to desired outcomes, occurs through goal-di-
rected and habit memory systems. Exposure to acute stress has been shown to result in less goal-directed control,
thus rendering behavior more habitual. The aim of the current studies was to replicate and extend findings on
stress-induced prompting of habitual responding and specifically focused on the role of stress-induced cortisol
reactivity. Study 1 used an established outcome devaluation paradigm to assess goal-directed and habitual
control. Study 2 utilized a modified version of this paradigm that was intended to establish stronger habitual
responding through more extensive reward training and applying a relevant behavioral devaluation procedure
(i.e., eating to satiety). Both studies failed to replicate that stress overall, i.e., independent of cortisol reactivity,
shifted behavior from goal-directed to habitual control. However, both studies found that relative to stress-
exposed cortisol non-responders and no-stress controls, participants displaying stress-induced cortisol reactivity
displayed prominent habitual responding. These findings highlight the importance of stress-induced cortisol
reactivity in facilitating habits.
1. Introduction
Stress is omnipresent in our modern society. We all experience it for
various reasons (e.g., near-impossible deadlines, daily hassles), and
most of us think of stress as an unpleasant fact of everyday life.
Exposure to stressful events activates the autonomic nervous system
(ANS) and the hypothalamus-pituitaryadrenal (HPA) axis, causing the
release of catecholamines (e.g., adrenalin and noradrenalin) and glu-
cocorticoids (cortisol in humans and monkeys; corticosterone in many
other species) by the adrenal cortex into the bloodstream (Ulrich-Lai &
Herman, 2009). The stress-induced increase in activity of the ANS and
HPA stress systems leads to physiological and cognitive-behavioral al-
terations that served an adaptive purpose (i.e., to increase chances of
survival; de Kloet, Joels, & Holsboer, 2005; McEwen, 1998, 2008). For
example, acute stress responses via their joint actions on brain struc-
tures central to memory (e.g., the basolateral amygdala; see de
Quervain, Schwabe, & Roozendaal, 2017; Roozendaal & McGaugh,
2011) endorse the formation of lasting memories by enhancing memory
consolidation (e.g., Smeets, Otgaar, Candel, & Wolf, 2008) whilst con-
currently impairing memory retrieval processes (e.g., see Shields,
Sazma, McCullough, & Yonelinas, 2017; Wolf, 2009, 2017, for com-
prehensive reviews). Moreover, stress affects instrumental learning by
promoting the favorable use of rather rigid and undemanding habits
over flexible yet cognitively demanding goal-directed behavior
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010; for review see Schwabe & Wolf, 2013;
Schwabe, Wolf, & Oitzl, 2010; Wirz, Bogdanova, & Schwabe, 2018).
Learning that specific behaviors lead to specific desired outcomes,
so-called instrumental learning, is thought to be under the control of a
goal-directed and a habit system (O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017;
Wood & Rünger, 2016). An outcome devaluation paradigm is generally
used to determine whether behavior is controlled by the goal-directed
or the habit system. Here, an outcome is devalued and subsequent re-
sponding to that outcome is observed. If responding to the devalued
outcome is reduced, behavior is interpreted as being goal-directed.
Alternatively, if continued responding to a devalued outcome is ob-
served, then behavior is said to be controlled by the (stimulus-response
governed) habit system. The modulation of goal-directed and habitual
control by exposure to acute stress was first observed in humans in a
seminal study by Schwabe and Wolf (2009). Using a selective outcome
devaluation paradigm originally developed by Valentin, Dickinson, and
O’Doherty (2007), the authors found that participants exposed to acute
stress before instrumental learning were insensitive to outcome deva-
luation, and consequently responded more habitual than non-stressed
controls. In a follow-up study, Schwabe and Wolf (2010) demonstrated
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that stress influences the expression of habitual behavior, with stress
after instrumental learning and outcome devaluation leading to more
habitual responding. Since then, several studies have shown that acute
stress shifts behavior from goal-directed to habitual responding (for
review see Schwabe & Wolf, 2013; Wirz et al., 2018).
The finding that stress prompts the use of habits has been reported
not only in studies using Valentin et al.’s (2007) instrumental learning
paradigm, but also in studies that used probabilistic classification
learning tasks (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2012; Schwabe, Tegenthoff,
Höffken, & Wolf, 2013) or sequential decision making tasks measuring
model-based versus model-free learning (indicative of goal-directed vs.
habitual learning, respectively; Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw,
2013; Radenbach et al., 2015). However, in those latter sequential
decision making studies the effect of stress on habitual responding was
restricted to participants with low working memory (Otto et al., 2013)
or when acute stress was combined with chronic stress effects
(Radenbach et al., 2015). Furthermore, using a widely-used outcome
devaluation paradigm that assesses the relative balance between goal-
directed and habitual responding following instructed devaluation in a
slips-of-action test (de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007),
Fournier, d'Arripe-Longueville, and Radel (2017) found no effect of
stress applied prior to instrumental learning on the fostering of habits.
Thus, it seems that the finding of acute stress encouraging the use of
habits has not been unequivocal, and that this may have to do with
differences in how goal-directed and habitual behavior is oper-
ationalized. Interestingly, several studies reported significant correla-
tions between stress-induced cortisol increases and the shift from goal-
directed to habitual responding (Otto et al., 2013; Radenbach et al.,
2015; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010; Schwabe, Höffken, Tegenthoff, & Wolf,
2011; Vogel et al., 2017; for an exception see Schwabe & Wolf, 2012).
This demonstrates the importance of cortisol as a potential mechanism
underlying the stress-induced shift towards habits.
With this in mind, the aim of the current studies was to replicate and
extend findings on stress-induced shifting to habitual responding by
specifically focusing on stress-induced cortisol reactivity (i.e., differ-
ences between cortisol responders and non-responders). Study 1 used
an established outcome devaluation paradigm to dissociate goal-di-
rected from habitual action (de Wit et al., 2007; see also Fournier et al.,
2017), while in Study 2 we modified this paradigm to establish stronger
habitual responding. Study 2’s modified instrumental learning para-
digm included more extended instrumental learning and rewarding
participants for learning the correct associations, and applied a relevant
behavioral devaluation (i.e., eating to satiety) instead of an instructed
(cognitive) devaluation (see also de Houwer et al., in press). We ex-
pected that acute stress would lead to a stronger expression of habitual
responding compared to a non-stressed control group, and that this
effect would be more pronounced in stressed participants displaying
high cortisol responses (Study 1 and Study 2) and when more ideal
conditions are created to induce a shift from goal-directed to habitual
responding by using the modified instrumental learning paradigm
(Study 2).
2. Study 1
2.1. Study 1 Method
2.1.1. Participants
Seventy-two healthy undergraduates (20 men; 52 women) with a
mean age of 21.5 years (range=18–28; SD=2.31) and a normal Body
Mass Index (BMI in kg/m2; range=18.1–27.6; Mean=22.27;
SD=2.39) enrolled in Study 1. Participants were randomly allocated to
a stress or no-stress control group. Groups did not differ in age
(t70= 1.44, p= .15), BMI (t70= 0.77, p= .44] or distribution of men
and women (χ2(1,N=72)= 2.49, p= .11]. Participants were recruited
via advertisements that requested volunteers for a study examining
cognition in response to physical and mental challenges. Eligibility was
assessed using a semi-structured interview, with cardiovascular dis-
eases, severe physical illnesses (e.g., fibromyalgia), hypertension, en-
docrine disorders, current or lifetime psychopathology, substance
abuse, heavy smoking (> 10 cigarettes/day) or being on any kind of
medication known to affect the HPA-axis serving as exclusion criteria.
Test protocols were approved by the standing ethics committee of the
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, and
complied with the declaration of Helsinki (v. 2013). All participants
provided informed consent and received a small financial reward or
partial course credit in return for their participation.
2.1.2. Stress vs. no-stress control procedure
The stress group was exposed to the Maastricht Acute Stress Test
(MAST; Smeets et al., 2012, see also Quaedflieg, Meyer, van
Ruitenbeek, & Smeets, 2017; Shilton, Laycock, & Crewther, 2017), an
effective acute stressor that combines psychological and physical
components. The MAST commences with a 5-minute instruction phase,
followed by a 10-minute acute stress phase that involves repeatedly
inserting the non-dominant hand in ice-cold water (4 °C), alternated
with a challenging mental arithmetic task entailing the counting
backwards in steps of 17 starting at 2043 as fast and accurate as pos-
sible. To induce social evaluative threat, participants were videotaped
during the MAST and negative feedback was provided on their per-
formance.
The control group completed a validated no-stress control condition
that was equal in length and involved similar operations as the MAST,
but without the stress-eliciting components. Here, participants im-
mersed their non-dominant hand in lukewarm water (35 °C) and per-
formed a simple counting test without being videotaped or receiving
negative feedback (see Smeets et al., 2012, Exp. 3).
2.1.3. Neuroendocrine stress responses
As an index of neuroendocrine reactivity, salivary cortisol was
sampled via synthetic Salivette (Sarstedt®, Etten-Leur, the Netherlands)
devices immediately before (i.e., tbaseline) and 1, 20, and 35min after
end of the stress/control procedure (i.e., t+01, t+20, t+35). Samples
were stored at −20 °C immediately on collection. Cortisol levels were
determined by a commercially available chemiluminescence im-
munoassay (IBL Intl, Hamburg, Germany), with mean intra- and inter-
assay coefficients of variation<8%.
2.1.4. Instrumental learning task
Participants engaged in an instrumental learning task (de Wit et al.,
2007) that was presented to them as a game in which they were re-
quired to earn as many points as possible to earn certain food rewards.
In the first, instrumental learning stage, participants had to learn by
trial-and-error 6 different Stimulus-Response-Outcome (SRO) associa-
tions. On each trial, a picture of a closed box was shown with a stimulus
(e.g., an orange) depicted on it, and participants were instructed to give
an instrumental response by pressing with their dominant hand either
the left or the right response key. If they pressed the correct key, the box
opened and an outcome stimulus was shown inside the box (e.g., an
apple) and points were earned (ranging from 5 to 1 depending on the
speed with which they responded). If they pressed the incorrect key, the
box opened but remained empty and no points were earned. All SRO
combinations had a 100% contingency rate, meaning that each stimulus
could serve as a perfect cue for the related response-outcome con-
tingency. The instrumental learning phase is self-paced and comprised
12 blocks of 12 trials such that each SRO combination was presented
twice per block in a random order (144 trials in total). After each block,
participants were provided with feedback by showing their block score
and cumulative total score thus far. SRO instrumental learning perfor-
mance was determined by calculating the correct response rate for each
block. To familiarize themselves with the task, participants received a
12-trial demo training with stimuli and outcomes that were unrelated to
those used in the actual task.
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The second stage of the instrumental learning task consists of a slips-
of-action task to measure the relative balance between the goal-directed
and habitual control systems and a baseline responding test to control for
general task demands (e.g., response inhibition). At the beginning of
each of 6 slips-of-action blocks, participants were shown an overview
with all 6 outcomes (open boxes with fruits inside) from the first in-
strumental learning phase arranged in a 2×3 array for 10 s on the pc
screen. Two of the outcomes had a red cross superimposed on them, and
participants were clearly instructed that these two outcomes would
from now on no longer earn points, but instead would lead to a sub-
traction of points if on these specific trials they continued to press the
associated response key (i.e., instructed, cognitive outcome devalua-
tion). Participants were then shown a rapid series of stimuli from the
first phase (i.e., closed boxes with fruits depicted on the outside) with
the instruction to press the keys to open the boxes that would lead to
still-valuable outcomes (“Go trials”) to gain more points, and to refrain
from responding to the stimuli that would lead to devalued outcomes
(“No-Go trials”) to avoid losing points from their total. No trial-by-trial
feedback was provided, but participants were shown their total score at
the end of each block. Each of 3 blocks contained in a random order all
stimuli 6 times, with each outcome being devalued twice across all
blocks. Thus, participants completed in total 108 trials in the slips-of-
action phase, from which the percentage responses to Go and No-Go
trials could be derived. Reliance on stimulus-response habits should
lead to errors (i.e., continued pressing of the response key) towards no-
longer-valuable outcomes on the No-Go trials. In contrast, dominant
goal-directed control should allow for selective responding towards
still-valuable outcomes on the Go trials.
In the baseline responding test, stimuli are devalued as opposed to
(consequent) outcomes/goals as in the slips-of-action test (de Wit et al.,
2007; Worbe, Savulich, de Wit, Fernandez-Egea, & Robbins, 2015).
Participants were instructed to withhold responses to a subset of the
stimuli (“No-Go trials”) while still responding to the other stimuli (“Go
trials”). The baseline responding test included 3 blocks containing all
stimuli 6 times, for a total of 108 baseline responding trials. The slips-
of-action and baseline responding test were counterbalanced across
participants. For an example of the instrumental learning paradigm, see
Fig. 1 (Panel A).
2.2. Study 1 Procedure
Participants were tested in individual morning sessions between
09 h and 12 h. They were asked not to brush their teeth and to refrain
from food, drinks, and intense physical exercise at least 2 h prior to the
test phase, and none reported to have violated these directives. After
arrival in the laboratory, participants read information about the study
and provided written informed consent. Participants then were ex-
plained in detail the instrumental learning task and engaged in the
demo training, after which the actual instrumental learning phase
commenced. Next, a first saliva sample was taken right before, and a
second one immediately after, the stress/control procedure.
Participants started the slips-of-action and baseline test of the instru-
mental learning task 5min after the end of the stress/control procedure,
followed by the collection of two more saliva samples, being fully de-
briefed, and reimbursement. The experimental timeline can be seen in
Fig. 1 (Panel B).
2.3. Study 1 Statistical analyses
Data were checked for non-normality using Q-Q plots and Shapiro-
Wilk tests of normality. One male participant from the control group
was excluded from further analyses as his baseline cortisol level was
more that 3SD above the mean (i.e., 87.2 nmol/l). Thus, the final
sample consisted of 71 participants. As the cortisol data were skewed, a
log-transformation was performed before these data were used in sub-
sequent analyses. Cortisol data were analyzed first with a 2(Group:
stress vs. control)× 4(Time: tpre-stress, t+01, t+20, t+35) mixed ANOVA,
with the latter factor being a repeated measure. To examine the influ-
ence of stress-induced cortisol reactivity, we computed the maximum
increase in cortisol by subtracting the baseline level from the maximum
value measured after stress, and then categorized each participant in
the stress group as a cortisol responder when showing a cortisol in-
crease equal to or larger than 1.5 nmol/l (Miller, Plessow, Kirschbaum,
& Stadler, 2013) or as a cortisol non-responder when the cortisol levels
increased less than 1.5 nmol/l. This resulted in a group of 25 cortisol
responders and a group of 11 cortisol non-responders. Group allocation
was then confirmed using a 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol responders vs.
cortisol non-responders vs. controls)× 4(Time: tpre-stress, t+01, t+20,
t+35) mixed ANOVA. Percentage correct responses from the instru-
mental learning phase were subjected to a 2(Group: stress vs. con-
trol)× 12(Block: B1-B12) mixed ANOVA, while the percentage re-
sponses made in the slips-of-action and baseline tests were analyzed
with 2(Group: stress vs. control) × 2(Value: devalued vs. valuable)
mixed ANOVAs. Data from the instrumental learning, slips-of-action,
and baseline test phases were subsequently also examined using 3(Re-
sponderGroup: cortisol responders vs. cortisol non-responders vs. con-
trols)× 12(Block: B1-B12) and 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol responders
vs. cortisol non-responders vs. controls)× 2(Value: devalued vs. valu-
able) mixed ANOVAs to specifically look at the effects of strong stress-
induced cortisol responses. Whenever sphericity assumptions were
violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values are reported. Alpha
was set at 0.05 and Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons
where necessary. In case of significant results, ANOVAs are supple-
mented with Partial Eta Squared (ηp2) values as a measure of effect size,
which represent the proportion of total variation attributable to the
independent variable after partialling out the contribution of the other
variables under investigation. ηp2 values of 0.01 indicate small effects,
0.06 represent medium effects, and 0.14 constitute large effects (Fritz,
Morris, & Richler, 2012).1
2.4. Study 1 Results
2.4.1. Neuroendocrine stress responses
Fig. 2 shows cortisol responses to the stress/control procedure for
the stress and control groups (Panel A) and cortisol responders, non-
responders, and controls (Panel B). As can be seen, the stress induction
procedure was successful in increasing cortisol levels in the stress group
exclusively (Group * Time interaction: F3,207= 25.36, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.27). Simple effects showed that groups differed significantly in
cortisol concentrations at t+20 (F1,69= 9.38, p= .003) and t+35
(F1,69= 8.13, p= .006), but not at tpre-stress (F1,69= 0.60, p= .44) or
t+01 (F1,69= 1.04, p= .31). Likewise, cortisol responders differed from
cortisol non-responders and controls (ResponderGroup * Time interac-
tion: F6,204= 36.58, p < .001, ηp2= 0.52), with simple effects tests
again confirming that cortisol responders differed significantly in cor-
tisol concentrations from cortisol non-responders and controls at t+20
(p= .004 and p < .001, respectively) and t+35 (p= .010 and
p < .001, respectively), but not at tpre-stress or t+01 (all ps > .50).
2.4.2. Instrumental learning performance
Instrumental learning did not differ between stress and control
group (Group * Block interaction: F11,759= 0.87, p= .50), and in-
creased significantly over the 12 learning blocks (Block:
F11,759= 95.20, p < .001, ηp2= 0.58) in the absence of a main effect
of Group (F1,69= 0.25, p= .62). The same pattern was found for the
1 As the effects of acute stress on memory and cognition may differ between men and
women (Andreano & Cahill, 2009; Merz & Wolf, 2017; Shields et al., 2017), all analyses
pertaining to the instrumental learning task in Study 1 were also repeated with sex in-
cluded as an additional between-subject factor. In none of the Group or ResponderGroup
analyses did sex moderate the learning performance or slips-of-action performance (no
significant main or interactive effects of Sex, all ps > .05).
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Fig. 1. Panel A shows an example of the original instrumental learning task used in Study 1. Panel B shows the timeline of Study 1’s experimental events, with t0
referring to end of the stress induction or control procedure and Ss denoting times when saliva was sampled.
Fig. 2. Study 1 cortisol responses for the stress and control group (Panel A) and for the cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders, and controls separately (Panel B).
The stress/control procedure is represented by the shaded area. Graphs show mean (untransformed) values ± SE.
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comparison between cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders and
controls (ResponderGroup * Block interaction: F22,748= 0.69, p= .73;
Block: F11,748= 73.14, p < .001, ηp2= 0.52; Group: F2,68= 0.35,
p= .71). All groups reached near-ceiling levels of accuracy already at
the 8th block and remained high afterwards (e.g., Block 12: cortisol
responders: 98%; cortisol non-responders: 94%; controls: 97%), in-
dicating successful acquisition of the SRO contingencies (see
Supplementary Materials, Fig. S1).
2.4.3. Slips-of-action and baseline test performance
Performance on the crucial slips-of-action test is shown in Fig. 3.
Stress and control group unexpectedly did not differ in terms of re-
sponses made towards valuable or devalued outcomes (Group * Value:
F1,69= 2.05, p= .16; Group (F1,69= 2.05, p= .15), with more re-
sponses made to still-valuable outcomes relative to devalued outcomes
(Value: F1,69= 415.62, p < .001, ηp2= 0.86) (see Fig. 3 Panel A). In
contrast, high cortisol stress responders differed from cortisol non-re-
sponders and controls on goal-directed versus habitual behavior (Re-
sponderGroup * Value: F2,68= 3.76, p= .028, ηp2= 0.10; cf. Fig. 3
Panel B). Simple effects revealed that groups differed on percentage
responses made towards devalued (ResponderGroup: F2,68= 4.25,
p= .018) but not valuable (ResponderGroup: F2,68= 1.28, p= .29)
outcomes. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that cortisol re-
sponders exhibited stronger habitual behavior, as indicated by them
making more responses to devalued outcomes than cortisol non-re-
sponders (p= .019) and controls (p= .015). Cortisol non-responders
and controls did not differ in percentage responses to devalued out-
comes (p= .54).
To control for general task characteristics (e.g., inhibitory control)
of the slips-of-action test, performance on the baseline test was ana-
lyzed (see Supplementary Materials, Fig. S2). Stress and control group
did not differ in baseline performance (Group * Value: F1,69= 0.35,
p= .56; Group: F1,69= 0.52, p= .47), and displayed the expected main
effect of Value (F1,69= 2481.52, p < .001, ηp2= 0.97). The same
holds true for baseline performance between cortisol responders, cor-
tisol non-responders and controls (ResponderGroup * Value:
F2,68= 1.63, p= .20; ResponderGroup: F2,68= 0.72, p= .49; Value:
F1,68= 2097.86, p < .001, ηp2= 0.97).
2.5. Summary Study 1
Study 1 found evidence that stress-induced cortisol elevations are
linked to an increased reliance on habitual behavior at the expense of
goal-directed behavior. That is, compared to cortisol non-responders
and no-stress controls, cortisol responders displayed more responding
towards cues that would lead to no-longer valuable outcomes (slips-of-
action), while no differences were found for responding towards still-
valuable outcomes. However, on a group level, study 1 failed to re-
plicate the finding that stressed individuals become insensitive to the
value of outcomes relative to controls (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2009).
The discordance between previous findings and the results of Study
1 may be due to differences in the used outcome devaluation paradigm.
Indeed, most work evidencing a stress-induced shift towards habits
employed an outcome devaluation paradigm that involved instrumental
learning of response-outcome associations followed by a behavioral
devaluation procedure (e.g., eating to satiety), after which instrumental
Fig. 3. Study 1 performance on the slips-of-action test for the stress and control group (Panel A) and for the cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders, and controls
separately (Panel B). Bars show mean (± SE) percentage responses made towards still-valuable and devalued outcomes, with higher percentages of responding
towards devalued outcomes indicating increased reliance on habitual behavior.
T. Smeets et al. Brain and Cognition 133 (2019) 60–71
64
responding was evaluated in an extinction test (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf,
2009, 2010). Here, we used explicit instructions to devalue certain
outcomes and tested instrumental performance in a slips-of-action test
(de Wit et al., 2007), and found no evidence for a general stress-induced
shift to habitual responding. Notably, Fournier et al. (2017) recently
used the same outcome devaluation paradigm by de Wit et al. (2007) as
in our Study 1 to examine time-dependent effects of stress on instru-
mental behavior. These authors compared no-stress controls to parti-
cipants who either were stressed before instrumental learning and
tested for slips-of-actions in the absence of stress (24 h later) or were
stressed prior to the slips-of-action phase (but not before instrumental
learning 24 h earlier). Relative to the no-stress controls, only partici-
pants stressed before the slips-of-action phase were found to display a
shift towards more habitual responding. Thus, using the same in-
structed outcome devaluation procedure (i.e., by crossing out devalued
outcomes), Fournier et al. (2017) were unable to replicate that stress
prior to instrumental learning shifts behavior from goal-directed to
habitual control (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). All in all, the findings by
Fournier et al. (2017) and our Study 1 may be indicative of the in-
structed (cognitive) devaluation and subsequent slips-of-action test
being less sensitive to assess shifts in goal-directed to habitual control of
instrumental behavior following stress than the behavioral outcome
devaluation and subsequent extinction test used in the work by
Schwabe and colleagues (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010).
Study 2 was designed to directly test – via a modified instrumental
learning paradigm – whether including a recognized effective beha-
vioral devaluation procedure (i.e., eating to satiety) could increase the
sensitivity of a slips-of-action test for finding stress-induced differences
in the balance between goal-directed and habitual responding.
Moreover, the formation of habits is said to occur when responses are
frequently rewarded during associative SRO learning. Given that ex-
tensive instrumental training leads to stronger habitization (Tricomi,
Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009; for similar evidence in rodents see for
example Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995), Study 2
also endeavored to increase the strength of the instrumentally learned
associations by including more learning trials and by rewarding parti-
cipants for learning the associations.
3. Study 2
3.1. Study 2 Method
3.1.1. Participants
Sixty healthy undergraduates (24 men; 36 women) with a mean age
of 23.02 years (SD=3.57; range=19–35) and a mean BMI of 22.12
(SD=2.53; range=18.1–27.2) participated in the current study. Stress
and no-stress control group did not differ in age (t58=−0.36, p= .97)
or BMI (t58= 0.76, p= .45]. We pseudo-randomly assigned 12 men
and 18 women to each group. Eligibility was assessed as per Study 1.
Test protocols were approved by the standing ethics committee of the
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. All
participants provided written informed consent and received a small
financial reward or partial course credit in return for their participa-
tion.
3.1.2. Stress vs. no-stress control procedure
Study 2’s stress induction and no-stress control procedures were
identical to those of Study 1 (i.e., MAST and placebo MAST; Smeets
et al., 2012).
3.1.3. Neuroendocrine stress responses
Salivary cortisol was collected immediately before (i.e., tbaseline) and
1, 15, and 30min after end of the stress/control procedure (i.e., t+01,
t+15, t+30), and subsequently stored and analyzed as per Study 1.
3.1.4. Modified instrumental learning task
We modified Study 1’s instrumental learning task by including more
learning trials and providing occasional food rewards to form stronger
habitual responses during the learning phase, and by including a be-
havioral devaluation manipulation (cf. Valentin et al., 2007, Schwabe &
Wolf, 2009) to more effectively devalue certain outcomes. The modified
instrumental learning task comprised three stages: instrumental
learning, behavioral outcome devaluation, and a slips-of-action test (see
Fig. 4 Panel A).
The modified instrumental learning stage used instructions (earn as
many points as possible) and a demo phase analogous to those of Study
1, and also included 6 to-be-learned SRO associations, each one pre-
sented twice per block of 12 trials. There were, however, 16 blocks (192
trials in total) instead of 12 to further strengthen the learned
Fig. 4. Panel A provides an example of the sweet task version of Study 2’s modified three-stage instrumental learning paradigm. Study 2’s sequence of experimental
events is shown in Panel B, with t0 referring to end of the stress induction or control procedure and Ss denoting times when saliva was sampled.
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associations. SRO instrumental learning performance was determined
by calculating the correct response rate for each block. Aside from trial-
by-trial feedback and showing participants’ block and cumulative total
scores after each block as per Study 1, we also implemented a reward
incentive after blocks 4, 8, 12, and 16. Three very small pieces of food
corresponding to three of the outcomes in the game were used as re-
ward incentives. Participants were misleadingly told that if they
learned the associations above a certain threshold level (which was left
undefined), they would receive food rewards. In reality, all participants
were given the food rewards and had to eat them independent of their
learning performance.
Next, we implemented a behavioral outcome devaluation stage to
abolish the reward value of half of the outcomes. Participants had to
consume foods corresponding to 3 out of 6 outcomes until fully satiated.
Participants were first given a small piece of each of the 3 to-be-deva-
lued food outcomes, representing the minimum amount that they had
to eat (± 50 g in total). After consuming the minimum amount, a large
bowl filled with the 3 foods was put on the desk table in front of them,
having first closely weighted and noted down the beginning net weight
(± 200 g). Participants were instructed to take a seat in a comfortable
position in front of a 22″ screen and were told that during the next 11½
minutes they were going to watch a compilation of funny sketches
taken from the popular American TV show “Friends”, during which
they had to eat as much as possible without getting sick to their sto-
mach. Lights in the lab room were dimmed as the compilation movie of
Friends started. Thus, as per Watson, Wiers, Hommel, and de Wit
(2014), we simulated a home environment to make participants feel
more comfortable while eating as much as they could. To check for
potential between-group differences in devaluation, we measured (1)
the exact amount of food that was consumed by each participant, and
(2) we obtained hunger (“How hungry are you at the moment?”; anchors:
0= not at all hungry – 100= very hungry) and willingness-to-eat (“Do
you feel like eating something tasty?”; anchors: 0= not at all – 100= very
much so) ratings before and after the outcome devaluation phase.
The third and final slips-of-action stage closely resembled that of the
original instrumental learning paradigm by de Wit et al. (2007; cf.
supra, Study 1), and assessed the relative balance between goal-directed
and habitual control. Each block started with all 6 outcomes displayed
in a 2× 3 array, with the 3 food outcomes used in the behavioral
outcome devaluation phase crossed out. This screen was identical for
each slips-of-action test block since participants were selectively de-
valued by consuming to satiety foods corresponding to half of the
outcomes. Thus, this screen merely served as a devaluation reminder.
There were 4 blocks of 48 trials, meaning that each SRO association was
probed 8 times per block. High levels of responding to devalued out-
comes are indicative of dominant stimulus-response habits, while se-
lective responding to the still-valuable outcomes only reflects goal-di-
rected control.
Three versions of this modified instrumental learning paradigm
were developed and tested in a pilot study, differing only in the type of
stimulus-outcome combinations that were used. The healthy task ver-
sion included pictures of vegetables and fruits (e.g., broccoli, cucumber,
apple) as stimulus-outcome combinations. Slices of apple, orange, and
banana served as food rewards in the instrumental learning phase and
were used as consumables in the outcome devaluation phase. A sweet
task version with stimulus-outcome pictures of sweets (e.g., lollipops,
marshmallows, M&Ms) used pieces of milk chocolate, M&Ms, and mini-
mars as food rewards and devalued outcomes. The third, salty task
version employed pictures of salted snacks (e.g., pretzels, liquorish,
peanuts) as stimulus-outcome combinations, and salted popcorn, crisps,
and Tuc crackers as food rewards and devalued outcomes. Pilot data
(N=60; 20 participants randomly assigned per task version) showed
that task versions did not differ in their instrumental learning perfor-
mance (both ps > .12 for main and interaction effect related to task
version; percentage correct over final 4 blocks > .96 for all task ver-
sions) or in relative balance between goal-directed and habitual
behavior in the slips-of-action phase (both ps > .14). Therefore, in
Study 2, we allowed participants to choose beforehand whether they
wanted to do the sweet or the salty task version. We excluded the
healthy version as during piloting too much fruit that remained un-
consumed had to be disposed of. In Study 2, 28 participants opted for
the sweet and 32 for the salty version.
3.2. Study 2 Procedure
Testing took place between 09 h and 12 h. The same directives (e.g.,
no drinking or eating beforehand) as in Study 1 were given to partici-
pants. After providing informed consent, participants were familiarized
with the instrumental learning task via instructions and demo training.
They then completed the instrumental learning and outcome devalua-
tion phases, after which a first saliva sample was taken. Participants
were then subjected to the stress/control procedure, and immediately
afterwards a second saliva sample was taken. Finally, the slips-of-action
phase was carried out and two more saliva samples were obtained,
followed by participants being debriefed and reimbursement. The ex-
perimental timeline of Study 2 can be seen in Fig. 4, Panel B.
3.3. Study 2 Statistical analyses
Data were checked for non-normality using Q-Q plots and Shapiro-
Wilk tests of normality. All baseline cortisol levels fell within the
normal (mean ± 3SD) range. A log-transformation was performed due
to skewness of the cortisol data. Cortisol data were analyzed analogous
to Study 1 (Group and ResponderGroup mixed ANOVA analyses), with
22 stressed participants categorized as cortisol responders and 8 as
cortisol non-responders. For one cortisol responder in the stress group,
cortisol data of t+01 and t+15 samples contained insufficient saliva to be
analyzed and, therefore, this participant is excluded in all cortisol (but
not other) analyses. Percentage correct responses of the instrumental
learning phase were analyzed using 2(Group: stress vs.
control)× 16(Block: B1-B16) and 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol re-
sponders vs. cortisol non-responders vs. controls)× 16(Block: B1-B16)
mixed ANOVAs. Effectiveness of the devaluation procedure was as-
sessed by calculating how much participants ate during devaluation,
and by inspecting changes from pre-devaluation to post-devaluation in
hunger and willingness-to-eat ratings. Amount of food eaten was ana-
lyzed using 2(Group: stress vs. control) and 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol
responders vs. cortisol non-responders vs. controls) univariate ANOVAs,
while changes in hunger and willingness-to-eat ratings were evaluated
with 2(Group: stress vs. control) × 2(Time: pre-devaluation vs. post-
devaluation) and 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol responders vs. cortisol
non-responders vs. controls)× 2(Time: pre-devaluation vs. post-deva-
luation) mixed ANOVAs. Percentage responses made in the slips-of-
action test was analyzed with 2(Group: stress vs. control)× 2(Value:
devalued vs. valuable) and 3(ResponderGroup: cortisol responders vs.
cortisol non-responders vs. controls)× 2(Value: devalued vs. valuable)
mixed ANOVAs.2,3 As per Study 1, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-
values are reported when sphericity assumptions were violated; alpha
was set at 0.05 and Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons
where necessary; and significant results from the ANOVAs are
2 As per Study 1, including sex as an additional between-subject factor in the Group and
ResponderGroup analyses of the learning or slips-of-action performance of Study 2 did
not alter the pattern of results (no significant main or interactive effects of Sex, all
ps > .05).
3 Note that in the original studies by Schwabe and Wolf (2009, 2010), the effect of
stress leading to more habits was restricted to analyses pertaining to the first 15-trial
block of the extinction phase. We therefore included Block (1–4) of the slips-of-action
phase as a repeated measure in our analyses of the data obtained via Study 2’s modified
instrumental learning paradigm, and found that the two- and three-way interactions in-
volving Group and Block (Fs < 1.77; ps > .17) and ResponderGroup and Block (Fs <
1.39; ps > .24) were non-significant. Thus, all subsequently reported analyses were
performed without Block included as a factor.
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supplemented with Partial Eta Squared (ηp2) values as a measure of
effect size.
3.4. Study 2 Results
3.4.1. Neuroendocrine stress responses
Cortisol responses to the stress/control procedure can be seen in
Fig. 5. Exposure to the stress procedure significantly increased cortisol
levels in the stress group only (Group * Time interaction:
F3,171= 26.66, p < .001, ηp2= 0.32), with simple effects demon-
strating group differences in cortisol concentrations at t+01
(F1,57= 27.92, p < .001), t+15 (F1,57= 66.74, p < .001) and t+30
(F1,57= 46.50, p < .001), but not at tpre-stress (F1,57= 2.49, p= .12).
Evidently, cortisol responders differed from cortisol non-responders and
controls (ResponderGroup * Time interaction: F6,168= 23.84,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.46), with simple effects corroborating that cortisol
responders differed significantly in cortisol concentrations from cortisol
non-responders and controls at t+01 (p= .008 and p < .001, respec-
tively), t+15 (both ps < .001), and t+30 (p= .002 and p < .001, re-
spectively), but not at tpre-stress (all ps > .60).
3.4.2. Instrumental learning performance
Instrumental learning rates did not differ between stress and control
group (Group * Block interaction: F15,870= 0.68, p= .68), As expected,
correct responses increased significantly over blocks (Block:
F15,870= 64.34, p < .001, ηp2= 0.53), without a main effect of Group
(F1,58= 0.04, p= .84). Instrumental learning rates also did not differ
between cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders and controls
(ResponderGroup * Block interaction: F30,855= 1.12, p= .30; Block:
F15,855= 43.73, p < .001, ηp2= 0.43; Group: F2,57= 2.70, p= .08).
Near-ceiling levels of accuracy indicating successful acquisition of the
SRO contingencies were observed in all groups at the end of the
learning phase (Block 16: cortisol responders: 95%; cortisol non-re-
sponders: 97%; controls: 98%; see Supplementary Materials, Fig. S3).
3.4.3. Effectiveness of the devaluation procedure
Stress and control group did not differ in how much food they ate
during the devaluation procedure (Group: F1,58= 0.10, p= .76).
Hunger ratings decreased significantly as expected (Time:
F1,58= 113.18, p < .001, ηp2= 0.66), and did not differ between
groups (Group * Time interaction: F1,58= 0.61, p= .44; Group:
F1,58= 2.15, p= .15). Also, in line with our expectations, participants
were less willing to eat after devaluation (Time: F1,58= 92.26,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.61), an effect that did not differ between groups
(Group * Time interaction: F1,58= 0.08, p= .78; Group: F1,58= 0.87,
p= .36). Amount of food consumed during devaluation across groups,
and pre- and post-devaluation hunger and willingness-to-eat ratings can
be found in Table 1.
Similar results were obtained when comparing cortisol responders,
cortisol non-responders, and controls. An equal amount of food was
eaten during devaluation in all groups (ResponderGroup: F2,57= 0.75,
Fig. 5. Study 2 cortisol responses for the stress and control group (Panel A) and for the cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders, and controls separately (Panel B).
The stress/control procedure is represented by the shaded area. Graphs show mean (untransformed) values ± SE.
Table 1
Mean amount (S.E.) of food (in grams) consumed during devaluation and pre-
and post-devaluation hunger and willingness-to-eat ratings (0–100) of the stress





Amount of food eaten 112.93 (7.87) 109.67 (6.94)
Pre-devaluation hunger 55.10 (4.14) 64.03 (3.96)
Post-devaluation hunger 20.50 (3.38) 23.93 (3.99)
Pre-devaluation willingness-to-eat 65.10 (3.28) 68.67 (4.49)
Post-devaluation willingness-to-
eat
29.20 (4.42) 34.83 (4.97)
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p= .48). Hunger did not differ between ResponderGroups
(Group * Time interaction: F2,57= 1.13, p= .33; Group: F2,57= 1.60,
p= .21), but decreased significantly over time (Time: F1,57= 78.44,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.58). Likewise, willingness-to-eat declined similarly
across groups (Group * Time interaction: F2,57= 1.48, p= .24; Group:
F2,57= 1.81, p= .17; Time: F1,57= 57.25, p < .001, ηp2= 0.50).
3.4.4. Slips-of-action performance
Fig. 6 displays participants’ performance on the slips-of-action test.
Replicating Study 1, stress and control group did not differ in terms of
balanced responding to still-valuable and devalued outcomes
(Group * Value: F1,58= 0.87, p= .36; Group (F1,58= 2.07, p= .16),
with more responses made to the still-valuable outcomes relative to
devalued outcomes (Value: F1,58= 571.39, p < .001, ηp2= 0.91) (see
Fig. 6 Panel A). Also, in line with our findings of Study 1, high cortisol
stress responders in Study 2 differed from cortisol non-responders and
controls on goal-directed versus habitual behavior (Re-
sponderGroup * Value: F2,57= 3.30, p= .044, ηp2= 0.10). Simple ef-
fects revealed that groups differed on percentage responses made to-
wards devalued (ResponderGroup: F2,57= 3.37, p= .042) but not still-
valuable (ResponderGroup: F2,57= 1.82, p= .17) outcomes (see Fig. 6
Panel B). Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that cortisol re-
sponders exhibited stronger habitual behavior, as indicated by them
making more responses to devalued outcomes than cortisol non-re-
sponders (p= .026) and controls (p= .047). Cortisol non-responders
and controls did not differ on responses to devalued outcomes
(p= .36).
3.5. Summary Study 2
Using a modified instrumental learning paradigm that capitalized
on more strongly formed habits and a true behavioral devaluation
procedure, Study 2 basically replicated the findings of Study 1. That is,
notwithstanding robust cortisol responses to the stressor and significant
decreases in willingness-to-eat and hunger ratings, selective behavioral
outcome devaluation in Study 2 did not lead stressed participants to
differ from no-stress control participants in their use of goal-directed
versus habitual control in the slips-of-action task. Also, Study 2 re-
plicated the finding that cortisol responding stressed participants made
more slips-of-action errors than both cortisol non-responders and con-
trols, indicating that cortisol responses are required for stress-induced
shifting towards habits to occur (cf. Schwabe & Wolf, 2010; Schwabe
et al., 2011).
4. Discussion
The current studies further examined the robustness of the finding
that stress provokes habitual behavior. In doing so, we employed an
outcome devaluation paradigm that is different from the previously
used instrumental learning task that consisted of instrumental reward
learning, behavioral outcome devaluation, and a crucial extinction test
to distinguish goal-directed from habitual control over behavior (e.g.,
Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010; Valentin et al., 2007). Specifically, we
assessed instrumental control of behavior using the slips-of-action
paradigm originally developed by de Wit et al. (2007), which has
proven successful in discriminating the balance between goal-directed
and habitual responding in various experimental contexts and
Fig. 6. Study 2 performance on the slips-of-action test for the stress and control group (Panel A) and for the cortisol responders, cortisol non-responders, and controls
separately (Panel B). Bars show mean (± SE) percentage responses to still-valuable and devalued outcomes.
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populations (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; de Wit, Barker, Dickinson, & Cools,
2011, 2012, 2014; Delorme et al., 2016; Fournier et al., 2017; Gillan,
et al., 2011; Worbe et al., 2015; for review of the different paradigms
see Watson & de Wit, 2018). The main results can be summarized as
follows. Both Study 1 and Study 2 found that participants displaying
stress-induced cortisol reactivity made more errors to devalued out-
comes in the slips-of-action phase – indicating prominent habitual re-
sponding – relative to stress-exposed cortisol non-responders and no-
stress controls. Both studies, however, failed to replicate that stress
overall, i.e., independent of cortisol reactivity, shifted behavior from
goal-directed to habitual control.
The importance of individual differences in cortisol responses as a
driving mechanism behind stress-induced alterations in the engagement
of habits versus goal-directed actions was demonstrated in the current
studies. Only in participants showing a clear-cut cortisol response larger
than 1.5 nmol/l (Miller et al., 2013) did we find that stress led to pre-
ferential habitual responses. This accords well with observations that
higher stress-induced cortisol responses were associated with increased
habitual responding (e.g., Otto et al., 2013; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010;
Schwabe et al., 2011). Also consistent with this conclusion are the re-
sults of a recent study by Goldfarb and colleagues, who examined the
influence of acute stress applied either post-learning (Goldfarb,
Mendelevich, & Phelps, 2017, Experiment 1) or pre-retrieval (Goldfarb
et al., 2017, Experiment 2) on the expression of learned stimulus-re-
sponse associations. Results showed that neither stress after learning
nor stress before retrieval affected the expression of habitual stimulus-
response memory. However, these authors did find that differences in
stress-induced cortisol reactivity post-learning were associated with
variability in initial stimulus-response learning.
There may be various reasons as to why some studies have found an
unambiguous effect of stress on instrumental learning and others only
under specific conditions (e.g., Fournier et al., 2017; Goldfarb et al.,
2017; Otto et al., 2013, Radenbach et al., 2015). One might speculate
that this has to do with the variability in the employed instrumental
learning paradigm, with the most convincing evidence of stress stimu-
lating habits coming from studies using a behavioral devaluation ma-
nipulation followed by an extinction test probing for previously learned
stimulus-response associations (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010) or a
probabilistic classification learning task (e.g., Schwabe et al., 2013;
Wirz, Wacker, Felten, Reuter, & Schwabe, 2017). Less clear evidence
was found in studies that used a sequential decision task (Otto et al.,
2013; Radenbach et al., 2015) or an outcome devaluation and slips-of-
action paradigm (Fournier et al., 2017). That the outcome devaluation
and slips-of-action paradigm by de Wit et al. (2007) used in the current
studies is seemingly less sensitive to pick up on subtle differences in the
balance between goal-directed and habitual behavior resulting from
stress exposure is surprising given the successful differentiation found
in various clinical populations and following certain pharmacological
manipulations (cf. supra). The slips-of-action paradigm of de Wit et al.
(2007) has also shown convergent validity with the sequential decision
making task (Sjoerds, et al., 2016), which in turn has shown to correlate
significantly with an outcome devaluation paradigm (Friedel et al.,
2014). Study 2 showed that more extensive training did not lead to a
stronger overall effect of stress on habitual behavior in the slips-of-ac-
tion phase. While this contradicts earlier rodent (e.g., Dickinson et al.,
1995) and at least one human (Tricomi et al., 2009) study, de Wit et al.
(in press) recently reported five independent studies that all showed no
evidence of extensive (over)training leading to stronger habits. More-
over, even though the behavioral outcome devaluation (i.e., having
participants eat until satiety) seemed to be very effective, as evidenced
by descriptively even fewer slips-of-action in Study 2 compared with
Study 1 that included an instructed devaluation procedure, this beha-
vioral outcome devaluation also did not result in a stronger effect of
stress on habitual behavior. All in all, this suggests that an outcome
devaluation paradigm that not only employs a behavioral devaluation
procedure but also tests for habits in a subsequent extinction test may
be needed to provide a sensitive measure of how acute stress affects
instrumental learning.
Another reason for the discrepant findings might be the diverse
ways in which stress was elicited and their potential to elicit strong
cortisol responses as, for example, it has been suggested that both low
and high levels of glucocorticoids can interfere in an inverted-U shaped
manner with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex dependent cognitive func-
tioning like goal-directed behavior (2007; Lupien, Gillin, & Hauger,
1999). The studies by Schwabe and co-workers (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf,
2009, 2010; Schwabe et al., 2013) demonstrating clear effects of stress
on the preference to express habitual behaviors mostly used the Socially
Evaluated Cold Pressor Test (SECPT; Schwabe, Haddad, & Schachinger,
2008), a stressor that has both physical and psychosocial elements and
is deemed more effective than the traditional Cold Pressor Test used in
the Goldfarb et al. (2017) and Otto et al. (2013) studies that found
equivocal evidence for stress prompting habits. The current studies used
the Maastricht Acute Stress Test (MAST; Smeets et al., 2012), which
also involves psychosocial and physical stress components but is longer
in duration than the SECPT and leads to large cortisol increases (see for
other validation studies Quaedflieg et al., 2017; Shilton et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, the current studies found evidence for more habitual
behavior only for those participants displaying a cortisol response
larger than 1.5 nmol/l. Note that although such cortisol responses were
present in the large majority of participants in both studies, no sig-
nificant overall effect of stress on habits was found. Finally, the studies
by Fournier et al. (2017), Radenbach et al. (2015), and Wirz et al.
(2017) employed the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke,
& Hellhammer, 1993), the most-often used and undoubtedly effective
psychosocial stress test. While Wirz et al. (2017) found the anticipated
effect of stress prompting habits, the Radenbach et al. (2015) and
Fournier et al. (2017) studies were indeterminate. Thus, there seems to
be no consistent relation between stressor type and the strength of the
finding that stress provokes habitual behavior.
Interestingly, in the current studies the magnitude of the cortisol
responses to the MAST differed substantially between Study 1 and
Study 2, with Study 1 yielding smaller cortisol increases within the
stress group than is typically obtained in our lab (e.g., Meyer, Smeets,
Giesbrecht, Quaedflieg, & Merckelbach, 2013; Quaedflieg et al., 2017;
Smeets et al., 2012) and Study 2 in contrast resulting in higher-than-
usual cortisol increases. We can only speculate why this was the case, as
elements that may lead to observable anticipatory stress reactions (e.g.,
timing of cortisol sampling relative to instructions about the upcoming
stressor) and the stress manipulation itself (i.e., the MAST) were kept
identical across studies. Also, there were no meaningful differences in
how many men were in the stress groups (Study 1: 13; Study 2: 12), and
while 30 out of 52 women in Study 1 were on oral contraceptives (of
which 16 were in the stress group and 14 in the control group), in Study
2 only women taking oral contraceptives were included. As the use of
oral contraceptives generally leads to reduced cortisol responses (e.g.,
Kirschbaum, Kudielka, Gaab, Schommer, & Hellhammer, 1999), it is
unlikely that differences in oral contraceptive use contributed to the
observed differences in cortisol responses between the current studies.
One potential reason for the amplified cortisol responses in Study 2 is
that in modifying the instrumental learning task we offered food re-
wards after certain learning blocks (cf. supra) and in the devaluation
phase participants also consumed food. Dietary energy supply levels are
known to regulate cortisol stress responses, and high glucose levels in
particular lead to more pronounced cortisol increases to stress (e.g.,
Gonzalez-Bono, Rohleder, Hellhammer, Salvador, & Kirschbaum,
2002). Thus, in Study 2 (but not Study 1) participants consumed food
before engaging in the stress test, which may have led to the observed
higher cortisol responses in Study 2.
Several studies have sought to elucidate the mechanisms by which
stress shifts behavior to become more dependent on the habit system.
Neuroimaging studies demonstrated that stress reduces the amygdala-
hippocampus connectivity while increasing the connectivity between
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the amygdala and the dorsal striatum (e.g., Schwabe et al., 2013, Wirz
et al., 2017), suggesting a pivotal role of noradrenergic arousal in the
(basolateral) amygdala for the stress-induced shift toward habitual
control of behavior. This is corroborated by pharmacological studies
showing that noradrenergic arousal is necessary for cortisol to shift
behavior towards habitual control (Schwabe, Tegenthoff, Höffken, &
Wolf, 2010), and that blocking noradrenergic arousal via administra-
tion of the beta-adrenergic antagonist propranolol abolishes the stress-
induced shift to habitual control (Schwabe et al., 2011). The crucial role
of glucocorticoids in modulating goal-directed and habitual learning is
supported by studies on the involvement of the cortisol-binding mi-
neralocorticoid receptor. For example, blocking the mineralocorticoid
receptor prevented enhanced stress-induced stimulus-response learning
in healthy men (Vogel et al., 2017; see also Schwabe et al., 2013). In
addition, a recent study showed that rats injected with glucocorticoids
in the dorsolateral striatum following training in finding rewards in a
cross-maze task were more efficient (i.e., faster) at learning stimulus-
response associations (Siller-Perez, Serafin, Prado-Alcala, Roozendaal,
& Quirarte, 2017). In summary, although future studies are needed to
draw firm conclusions, it is likely that interactive effects of stress-in-
duced cortisol reactivity and noradrenergic arousal in the basolateral
amygdala are the key switch in rendering behavior more habitual ra-
ther than engaging in a more flexible but cognitively demanding goal-
directed approach.
A few limitations of the current studies need to be acknowledged.
First, we did not assess (nor)adrenergic activity (e.g., via salivary alpha-
amylase) and thus cannot ascertain whether cortisol alone, or cortisol in
conjunction with noradrenergic activity, is responsible for the observed
effects. This latter hypothesis seems more likely given the currently
available evidence coming from a pharmacological study that found
noradrenergic arousal to be required for cortisol to lead to habitual
behavior (Schwabe, Tegenthoff, et al., 2010) and from a corroborative
study indicating that blocking noradrenergic arousal eliminates the
stress-induced shift to habits (Schwabe et al., 2011). Second, we also
did not assess subjectively experienced distress to the stress or control
procedure. While subjective distress and neuroendocrine measures of
stress such as cortisol often disagree (e.g., Diemer, 2017), it cannot be
excluded that high levels of subjective distress among the cortisol re-
sponders are primarily responsible for the observed effects on habitual
responding. Third, comparable to most studies examining the effect of
stress on instrumental behavior, the current studies relied on samples of
healthy undergraduate students. While employing this type of sample
has certain advantages such as being a rather homogenous group in
terms of age and educational background, it may also not translate
directly to clinical populations. This may be important given that while
two contemporary studies revealed that whereas obese participants
behaved habitual (i.e., they maintained responding for food rewards
after being satiated; Horstmann et al., 2015; Janssen, et al., 2017),
neither obese participants (Dietrich, de Wit, & Horstmann, 2016;
Watson, Wiers, Hommel, Gerdes, & de Wit, 2017) nor anorectic patients
(Godier, et al., 2016) displayed increased responding toward devalued
outcomes in a slips-of-action paradigm. Finally, habits are developed
more successfully and are more resistant to extinction when rewards are
provided on a partial (interval) reinforcement schedule (Dickinson,
1985). The instrumental learning paradigm employed in the current
studies used a continuous reinforcement schedule in that each correct
response during instrumental learning was rewarded with an outcome
and points, while that of Schwabe and Wolf (2009, 2010) used partial
reinforcement. Hypothetically, the difference in how compelling stress
and stress-induced cortisol responses affect the expression of habits
between the current studies and those of Schwabe and colleagues may
be explained by differences in reinforcement schedules during instru-
mental training.
Taken together, the current studies in conjunction with previous
work (e.g., Schwabe et al., 2011) demonstrate that cortisol reactivity
plays a prominent role in provoking habitual behavior following
exposure to an acute stressful situation. Such moving away from goal-
directed behavioral strategies under stress can be seen as adaptive since
cognitively demanding, effortful processes are superfluous in times
when all energy should be directed at coping with the stressful situa-
tion. Certainly, reverting to old habits can be deemed beneficial in most
stressful situations as relying on previously learned automatic behavior
(habits) is important for being able to successfully adjust to new or
varying environmental demands, and may safeguard the organism from
a stressful and potentially hazardous situation.
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